Abstract. In this paper, we establish two different characterizations of Walrasian expectations allocations by the veto power of the grand coalition in an asymmetric information economy having finite numbers of agents and states of nature and whose commodity space is a Banach lattice. The first one deals with Aubin non-dominated allocations, and the other claims that an allocation is a Walrasian expectations allocation if and only if it is not privately dominated by the grand coalition, by considering perturbations of the original initial endowments in precise directions.
Introduction
The classical deterministic Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model on an economic system consists of finitely many consumers, producers and commodities, refer to [3] and [17] . In late of 1950's, Arrow and Debreu introduced uncertainty into this deterministic model by adding contingent claims, [6, Chapter 7] . In this improved model, agents make contracts contingent on the realized state of nature known to all the agents. However, such a model does not capture the idea of contracts under asymmetric information as all agents face the same uncertainty. To overcome this shortcoming, Radner [21] introduced economies with asymmetric information. In Radner's model, an economy consists of finitely many agents, each of whom is characterized by a state dependent utility function, a random initial endowment, a private information set and his prior belief; and agents arrange contingent contracts for trading commodities before they obtain any information about the realized state of nature. Analogous to the concept of a Walrasian equilibrium in the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model, Radner also introduced the notion of a Walrasian expectations equilibrium for an asymmetric information economy so that the information of an agent places a restriction on his feasible trades: better information allows for more contingent trades, and each agent maximizes his ex ante expected utility subject to his budget constraint with respect to his private information. This individualistic behavior leads to a feasible redistribution of the initial endowments for each state of nature.
In this paper, we continue the study on asymmetric information economies. In particular, we are interested in asymmetric information economies whose commodity spaces are infinite dimensional spaces. In Section 2, we give a general description on a discrete model of an asymmetric information economy having finitely many of agents and states of nature, and whose commodity space is a Banach lattice. We also associate a continuum model with this discrete model. The continuum model has the equal treatment property. It is worth to mention that Tourky and Yannelis [24] and Podczeck [19] constructed counterexamples of economies to show that the classical core-Walras equivalence in [5] fails whenever the commodity space is a non-separable ordered Banach space. In both of these two papers, the authors used the Continuum Hypothesis in set theory to construct an economy with uncountably many utility functions. Since the commodity spaces of economies in our paper are Banach lattices which are not necessarily separable, our theorems give some positive results for asymmetric information economies whose commodity spaces are non-separable.
The concept of the private core of an asymmetric information economy was introduced in [27] . Einy et al. [8] showed that under appropriate assumptions, the private core coincides with the set of Walrasian expectations allocations for an atomless economy whose commodity space is Euclidean space. Hervés-Beloso et al. [15] established a similar result for an equal treatment economy whose commodity space is ℓ ∞ . By considering an atomless economy with asymmetric information, Evren and Hüsseinov [9] extended these results to an economy whose commodity space is an ordered separable Banach space which has an interior point in its positive cone. In Section 3, we establish a similar equivalence result for an equal treatment economy whose commodity space is a Banach lattice. In an atomless economy with a complete information and a finite dimensional commodity space, improving a result of [5] , Schmeidler [23] and Grodal [12] showed that (i) if some coalition blocks an allocation, then there is also a blocking subcoalition with arbitrarily small measure; and (ii) the small coalition can be the union of at most ℓ +1 coalitions, each of which has measure and diameter less than an arbitrary small number ǫ > 0, where ℓ is the number of commodities. In the same issue of Econometrica, Vind [26] extended (i) to show that if some coalition blocks then there is a blocking coalition with any measure less than the measure of the grand coalition. The first extension of the Schmeidler and Grodal's results to an infinite dimensional setting (the space ℓ ∞ ) were obtained in [13] , where it was also showed that the Vind's result fails in the space ℓ ∞ under the standard assumptions. Hervés-Beloso et al. [14] first extended Vind's theorem to an asymmetric information economy with a continuum of agents having the equal treatment property, and whose commodity space is Euclidean space. Later, Hervés-Beloso et al. [15] extended Vind's theorem to an asymmetric information economy with a continuum of agents having the equal treatment property and whose commodity space is ℓ ∞ . All of these extension are established by using finite-dimensional Lyapunov's convexity theorem. Using an infinite dimensional extension of Lyapunov's convexity theorem, Evren and Hüsseinov [9] further extended Vind's theorem to an atomless economy whose commodity space is an ordered Banach space having an interior point in its positive cone, with some additional assumption. Our second main result in Section 3 is an extension of Vind's theorem to an asymmetric information economy with the equal treatment property, and whose commodity space is a Banach lattice.
Addressing complete information economies with finitely many agents and commodities, Aubin [4] introduced the ponder veto concept and showed that the core obtained by this veto mechanism coincides with the Walrasian equilibria. Aubin's approach was employed by Gabriella Graziano, Meo and Hervés-Beloso et al. to characterize Walrasian expectations equilibria of asymmetric information economies. Hervés-Beloso et al. [14] introduced the notion of Aubin non-dominated allocations. Gabriella Graziano and Meo [10] showed that the Aubin private core provides a complete characterization of Walrasian expectations allocations in an economy with a complete measure space of agents. They also showed that Aubin private core allocations in an asymmetric information economy with a complete measure space of agents and an ordered separable Banach space whose positive cone has an interior point as the commodity space can be characterized by privately non-dominated allocations in suitable associated economies. Hervés-Beloso et al. [14, 15] established similar results for asymmetric information economies with finitely many agents and states of nature, and R ℓ or ℓ ∞ as the commodity space. The proof of Hervés-Beloso et al. was built on associated continuum economies and thus requires the validity of Vind's theorem, which is not the case in the proof of Gabriella Graziano and Meo [10] . In Section 4, we adopt the approach in [14, 15] to characterize Walrasian expectations equilibria in terms of the private blocking power of the grand coalition. Since our economic model has finitely many agents and a Banach lattice as the commodity space, our results can be considered as extensions of those in [14, 15] .
In the Appendix, an asymmetric information economy whose commodity space is a Banach lattice and which has infinitely many states of nature is discussed. Mathematical preliminaries and discussions on some assumptions are also provided in the Appendix. Of course, all of these mathematical preliminaries can be found in [1] .
Description of the model
In this section, we describe our model of an exchange economy with asymmetric information.
2.1. The discrete model. Our first model of an exchange economy is a discrete model E with (fixed) n agents denoted by the set N = {1, ..., n}, like those ones considered in [21, 22] . A measurable space (Ω, F ) is used to describe the exogenous uncertainty of E, where Ω is a finite set denoting the set of all possible states of nature and the σ-algebra F denotes the set of all events. The commodity space of E is a Banach lattice Y with a partial order ≤. The economy E extends over two time periods τ = 0, 1, and consumption takes place at τ = 1. At τ = 0, there is uncertainty over the states of nature and agents make contracts that may be contingent on the realized state of nature at τ = 1. More precisely, E is expressed
where the positive cone Y + of Y is the consumption set in each state of nature ω ∈ Ω for every agent i ∈ N ; F i is a partition of Ω representing the private information of agent i; U i : Ω × Y + → R is the random utility function of agent i; a i : Ω → Y + is the random initial endowment of agent i, assumed to be constant on elements of F i ; and q i is a probability measure on Ω giving the prior of agent i, assumed to be positive on all elements of Ω. For any random consumption bundle x : Ω → Y + , the ex ante expected utility of agent i is given by
An assignment in E is a function x = (x 1 , ..., x n ) which associates to every agent i a random consumption bundle x i : Ω → Y + , equivalently written as
Ω . We call a function with domain Ω, constant on elements of F i , F i -measurable, although measurability is meant with respect to the σ-algebra generated by the partition.
Further, an allocation x of E is privately dominated if there exists a feasible allocation y = (y 1 , ..., y n ) such that V i (y i ) > V i (x i ) for all i ∈ N . A feasible allocation x of E is called privately Pareto optimal if it is not privately dominated. A price system is an F -measurable, nonzero function π : Ω → Y * + , where Y * + is the positive cone of the norm-dual space Y * of Y . The budget set B i (π) of agent i under π is defined as
Given a feasible allocation x and a price system π in E, the pair (x, π) is called a Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium of E in the sense of Radner if (2.1) for all i ∈ N , x i ∈ B i (π) and the consumption bundle 3) π(ω), i∈N x i (ω) = π(ω), i∈N a i (ω) for each ω ∈ Ω. Throughout this paper, we put the following assumptions on our discrete model E. These assumptions or some of their combinations are used in different places of the paper.
(A 1 ) Continuity. For each i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω,
Irreducibility. For each feasible allocation x of E and any two non-empty disjoint subsets
, and i∈N1 a i (ω) + i∈N2 x i (ω) ≥ i∈N2 y i (ω) for each ω ∈ Ω. Remark 2.1. Under (A 1 ), V i is continuous with respect to the product topology induced by the norm. Under (A 2 ), V i is monotone in the sense that if x, y ∈ (Y + ) Ω with y(ω) > 0 for some ω ∈ Ω, then V i (x + y) > V i (x). Under (A 3 ), V i is concave. (A 6 ) implies that the aggregate endowments do not vary too much across states. (A 7 ) is similar to (A.3) in [8] . When Y = ℓ ∞ , assumptions (A 2 )-(A 4 ) are similar to (A.2)-(A.4) in [15] . Further, assumptions (A 1 )-(A 4 ) are similar to (A.2) and (A.3) in [10] , and (A.A3)-(A.A5) in [9] (except for the convexity).
The following proposition, which is a modification of Proposition 3.2 in [8] , shall be used in the sequel. Proposition 2.2. If E satisfies (A 7 ), then every non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium of E is a Walrasian expectations equilibrium.
Proof. Let (x, π) be a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium of E.
, and ω∈Ω π(ω), x i (ω) < ω∈Ω π(ω), y i (ω) for each i ∈ N 2 , which is a contradiction.
2.2.
A continuum interpretation. Now, we associate a continuum economy E c with the discrete model E, just like that in [11] and [14, 15] . The set of agents of E c is the unit interval I = [0, 1] endowed with the Lebesgue measure µ. We write
.., n − 1, and I n = n−1 n , 1 . Each agent t ∈ I i is characterized by the private information set F t = F i ; the consumption set Y + in each state ω ∈ Ω; the random initial endowment a(t, ·) = a i ; the random utility function U t = U i ; and the prior q t = q i . The ex ante expected utility function of every agent t ∈ I i is V t = V i . Thus, E c can be expressed as
We call I i the set of type i agents, and E c an economy with the equal treatment property. An assignment in E c is a function
A coalition in E c is a Borel measurable subset S ⊆ I with µ(S) > 0. A coalition S privately blocks an allocation f in E c if there is a function g : S ×Ω → Y + such that g(t, ·) ∈ L t and V t (g(t, ·)) > V t (f (t, ·)) for all t ∈ S, and S g(t, ω)dµ(t) ≤ S a(t, ω)dµ(t) for all ω ∈ Ω. The private core of E c is the set of all feasible allocations which are not privately blocked by any coalition.
Given a feasible allocation f and a price system π in E c , the budget set of an agent t ∈ I is B t (π) = B i (π) if t ∈ I i and i ∈ N . The pair (f, π) is called a Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium of E c in the sense of Radner if (2.4) for all t ∈ I, f (t, ·) ∈ B t (π) and f (t, ·) maximizes V t on B t (π) whenever
and (2.5) hold, then (f, π) is called a Walrasian expectations equilibrium of E c in the sense of Radner, and f is called a Walrasian expectations allocation. An allocation f in E c can be interpreted as an allocation x in E, where
Conversely, an allocation x in E can be interpreted as an allocation f in E c , where f is the simple function given by f (t, ·) = x i for all t ∈ I i and i ∈ N .
Analogous to Theorem 1 in [11] and Theorem 3.1 in [14, 15] , our next result shows that the discrete and continuum approaches can be considered equivalent with respect to Walrasian expectations (quasi-)equilibria. Proposition 2.3. Assume that E satisfies (A 3 ). If (x, π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium of E, then (f, π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium of E c , where f (t, ·) = x i if t ∈ I i . Conversely, if (f, π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium of E c , then (x, π) is a nontrivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium of E, where
Since the proof of Proposition 2.3 is straightforward, we omit it.
Remark 2.4. A similar conclusion holds if "non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium" is replaced with "Walrasian expectations equilibrium".
Characterizations of private cores of equal treatment economies
In this section, we establish a relation between the private core and the set of Walrasian expectations allocations in the setting of equal treatment, and give an extension of Vind's theorem. These two results allow us to obtain our main theorems in Section 4.4. [9] provided an equivalence theorem between the private core and the set of Walrasian expectations allocations in an economy whose commodity space is an ordered separable Banach space having an interior point in its positive cone. Next, we give a similar result for the case that the commodity space is a Banach lattice.
Equivalence results. Evren and Hüsseinov
Theorem 3.1. Assume that the commodity space of E has an interior point in its positive cone. Let f be a feasible allocation in E c such that f (t, ·) = x i for all t ∈ I i and i ∈ N . Under (A 1 ), (A 2 ) and (A 4 ), if f is in the private core of E c , then (f, π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium of E c for some non-zero
Applying the infinite dimensional extension of Lyapunov convexity theorem [25] to the proof of Proposition 5 in [16, p. 62 ], one can show that
is a convex subset of Y Ω , where A denotes the set of Lebesgue measurable subsets
Using the feasibility of f , one can show that x i ∈ B i (π) for all i ∈ N 1 . Thus, (x, π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium in E. By Proposition 2.3, (f, π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium in E c . Corollary 3.2. Let f be a feasible allocation such that f (t, ·) = x i for all t ∈ I i and i ∈ N . Under (A 1 ), (A 2 ), (A 4 ) and (A 7 ), f is a Walrasian expectations allocation if and only if f is in the private core of E c .
Next, we extend Theorem 3.1 to an asymmetric information economy with equal treatment property whose commodity space is a Banach lattice containing a quasiinterior point in its positive cone. For each i ∈ N and each
The following definition of ATY-properness is taken from [20] .
Lemma 3.4. Let Y be a real vector space endowed with a Hausdorff, locally convex topology τ and let U, V be convex subsets of Y such that U is open and U ∩ V = ∅. Let y ∈ V ∩ clU , where clU denotes the closure of U . Suppose that π is a linear functional (not necessarily continuous) on Y with π, y ≤ π, y ′ for all y ′ ∈ U ∩V . Then, there exist linear functionals π 1 and π 2 on Y such that π 1 is continuous,
Lemma 3.5. Let Y be a Riesz space endowed with a Hausdorff, locally convex topology
Lemma 3.6. Let Y be a Riesz space and let Z be an ideal in Y . Let y 1 , ..., y m be elements of Y and z 1 , ..., z m be elements of Z such that
For proofs of Lemmas 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6, see Lemmas 2 and 3 in [18] and Lemma 7 in [20] , respectively. In the proof of the next theorem, the argument to get continuity of the equilibrium price is similar to that in Theorem 2 of [20] . Our proof needs some additional construction because of the free disposal assumption.
Theorem 3.7. Assume that E satisfies (A 1 )-(A 4 ), (A 6 ) and (A 8 ). Let f be a feasible allocation in E c such that f (t, ·) = x i for all t ∈ I i and i ∈ N . If f is in the private core of E c , then (f, π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasiequilibrium of E c for some non-zero π : Ω → Y * + . Proof. Let f be in the private core of E c . Let Z = L(â), whereâ is selected according to (A 6 ). Then, (Z, · â ) is an AM -space withâ as an order unit. Note thatâ ∈ · â -intZ + , Z + is · â -closed in Z, and the · â -closed unit ball of Z coincides with the order interval [−â,â]. Define a new economyÊ which is identical with E except for the commodity space being Z equipped with the · â -topology, each agent's consumption set being Z + in each state of nature ω ∈ Ω, and agent i's ex ante expected utility being V i | Z Ω . If (y 1 , ..., y n ) is a feasible allocation of E, then y i (ω) ∈ Z + for each i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω. Thus, x i (ω) ∈ Z + for each i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω. Since i∈N a i (ω) is an order unit of Z, i∈N a i (ω) ∈ · â -intZ + for each ω ∈ Ω. Since (Z, · â ) is a Banach lattice, the · -topology is weaker than the · â -topology on Z. It follows that U i (ω, ·)| Z is · â -continuous. Thus, we have verified thatÊ satisfies (A 1 ), (A 2 ) and (A 4 ), and f is in the private core ofÊ c . By Theorem 3.1, there is a non-zero positive elementπ ∈ ((Z, · â ) * ) Ω such that (f,π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium inÊ c . We need to show that there is a non-zero positive π ∈ ((Z, · ) * ) Ω such that (f, π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium in E c | Z , where E c | Z is identical withÊ c except for the commodity space being Z with the norm · .
Since (f,π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium inÊ c , by Proposition 2.3, (x 1 , ..., x n ,π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium inÊ. Thus, (x 1 , ..., x n ) is a privately Pareto optimal allocation inÊ, and also in E. Let i ∈ N . By (A 8 ), there is a convex and
Since (Z, · â ) is a Banach lattice, (Z, · â ) * agrees with the order dual of Z. In what follows, let (Z, · â ) * be endowed with the dual ordering relative to the ordering of Z. Since each y i ∈L i can be written as y i = S∈Fi y S i 1 S , where y S i ∈ Z + and S ∈ F i , from (3.1) and (3.2), it can be verified that the following hold for all S ∈ F i :
Since (Z, · ) is a locally solid Riesz space, (Z, · ) * is an ideal in (Z, · â ) * . Pick an arbitrary element S ∈ F i . Sinceπ(ω) ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ S, by (3.3) and Lemma 3.6, there is an elementπ i ∈ ((Z, · ) * ) S such thatπ i ≤π on S and ω∈Sπ i (ω) =
Moreover, π i (ω), x i (ω) ≤ π(ω), x i (ω) for each ω ∈ S. So, we must have π i (ω), x i (ω) = π(ω), x i (ω) for each ω ∈ S, and the claim is verified. Since F i is a partition of Ω, there is an elementπ
By the Riesz-Kantorovich formulas, we obtain
Applyingπ ≤π, we have π(ω), i∈N a i (ω) = π(ω), i∈N a i (ω) for each ω ∈ Ω. Note that Z = L( i∈N a i (ω)) for each ω ∈ Ω. Let z ∈ Z + be fixed. Choose δ > 0 be such that z ≤ δ i∈N a i (ω) for each ω ∈ Ω. Then, π(ω), (δ i∈N a i (ω) − z) ≤ π(ω), (δ i∈N a i (ω) − z) , and so π(ω), z ≥ π(ω), z for each ω ∈ Ω. Consequently,π ≥π and therefore,π =π. Thus,π ∈ ((Z, · ) * ) Ω and (f,π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium in E c | Z . By the HahnBanach theorem, we can choose a positive element π ∈ ((Y, · )
is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium of E c . This completes the proof.
Corollary 3.8. Let f be a feasible allocation such that f (t, ·) = x i for all t ∈ I i and i ∈ N . Under (A 1 )-(A 4 ) and (A 6 )-(A 8 ), f is a Walrasian expectations allocation if and only if f is in the private core of E c . Now, we extend Theorem 3.7 to an asymmetric information economy with equal treatment property whose commodity space is a Banach lattice having no quasiinterior point in its positive cone. The following definition of strong ATY-properness and the argument to get continuity of the equilibrium price in the next theorem are similar to those in (A8 ′ ) and Theorem 3 of [20] .
(A 9 ) Strong properness. If (x 1 , ..., x n ) is a privately Pareto optimal allocation in E, then P i is strongly ATY-proper at x i for each i ∈ N . 
. Suppose that (y 1 , ..., y n ) is a privately Pareto optimal allocation in the economy E| X , which is identical with E except for the commodity space being X, each agent's consumption set being X + in each state of nature ω ∈ Ω, and agent i's ex ante expected utility being V i | X Ω . Then (y 1 , ..., y n ) is privately Pareto optimal in E.
) and (A 8 ) are satisfied for the economy E| X . Note that f is in the private core of E c | X . By Theorem 3.7, there exists a non-zero positive element π ∈ (X * ) Ω such that (f, π) is a nontrivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium in E c | X . Therefore, by Proposition 2.3, (x 1 , ..., x n , π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium in E| X . By the Hahn-Banach theorem, there is a non-zero positive elementπ ∈ (Y * ) Ω which is an extension of π. Then (x 1 , ..., x n ,π) satisfies all conditions of nontrivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium of E except for the fact that if
Clearly, this is true for all y i ∈L i .
Since (x 1 , ..., x n , π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium in E| X , (x 1 , ..., x n ) is privately Pareto optimal in E| X and hence, in E. Pick an i ∈ N . By (A 9 ), there is a convex and
By an argument similar to that in Theorem 3.7, we can find an element π
* , and it can be verified that
for all y i ∈ P i (x i ), and such that x 0 (ω) = i∈N a i (ω) − i∈N x i (ω) for each ω ∈ Ω. By the RieszKantorovich formulas and techniques similar to those in Theorem 3.7, we have π(ω), i∈N a i (ω) ≥ i∈N π i (ω), x i (ω) for each ω ∈ Ω. Using (3.5), we can obtain ω∈Ω π(ω), i∈N a i (ω) ≥ ω∈Ω π(ω), i∈N a i (ω) . Moreover, the RieszKantorovich formulas and (3.7) imply ω∈Ω π(ω), z(ω) ≤ ω∈Ω π(ω), z(ω) for all z ∈ X Ω + . Since Z Ω = L( i∈N a i ),π ≡π on Z Ω , which can be combined with (3.5) and (3.6) to derive ω∈Ω π(ω), x i (ω) ≤ ω∈Ω π(ω), y i (ω) for all y i ∈ P i (x i ). It follows from (A 2 ) and the fact that (x 1 , ..., x n ,π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations equilibrium in E| X , ω∈Ω π(ω),
. Thus, (x 1 , ..., x n ,π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium in E. Hence, by Proposition 2.3, (f,π) is a non-trivial Walrasian expectations quasi-equilibrium in E c .
Corollary 3.11. Let f be a feasible allocation such that f (t, ·) = x i for all t ∈ I i and i ∈ N . Under (
and (A 9 ), f is a Walrasian expectations allocation if and only if f is in the private core of E c .
3.2.
Blocking non-private core allocations. In this subsection, we give an extension of Vind's theorem to an asymmetric information economy with a continuum of agents having the equal treatment property and whose commodity space is a Banach lattice, using the following lemma instead of any convexity theorem on the commodity space.
Lemma 3.12. Assume that E satisfies (A 1 ), (A 3 ) and (A 5 ). Let f be an allocation such that f (t, ·) = f i for all t ∈ I i and i ∈ N . If f is privately blocked in E c , then it is privately blocked by a coalition A via a function g such that g(t, ·) = g i ∈ L i if t ∈ A ∩ I i and i ∈ N , and A (a(t, ω) − g(t, ω))dµ(t) ≥ z for all ω ∈ Ω, where z > 0.
Proof. Since f is privately blocked in E c , there are a coalitionÂ ⊆ I and an h :Â × Ω → Y + such thatĥ(t, ·) ∈ L t and V t (ĥ(t, ·)) > V t (f (t, ·)) for all t ∈Â, and Âĥ (t, ω)dµ(t) ≤ Â a(t, ω)dµ(t) for all ω ∈ Ω. LetÂ i =Â ∩ I i for each i ∈ N , N = {i ∈ N : µ(Â i ) = 0}, and A = i∈NÂ i . For each i ∈N and ω ∈ Ω, put then A (a(t, ω) − g(t, ω))dµ(t) ≥ z for all ω ∈ Ω and g(t, ·) ∈ L t for all t ∈ A, which is required by the lemma. Theorem 3.13. Assume that E satisfies (A 1 )-(A 3 ) and (A 5 ) . Let f be a feasible allocation in E c such that f (t, ·) = f i for all t ∈ I i and i ∈ N . If f is not in the private core of E c , then for any 0 < ǫ < 1, there is a coalition S with µ(S) = ǫ privately blocking f .
Proof. Since f is not in the private core of E c , by Lemma 3.12, there is a coalition A ⊆ I that privately blocks f via a function g :
, and µ(E) = δµ(A). Since δ A (a(t, ·) − g(t, ·))dµ(t) > 0 for any 0 < δ < 1, there is a coalition E ⊆ A with µ(E) = δµ(A) privately blocking f via g. This proves the theorem for ǫ ≤ µ(A).
If µ(A) = 1, the proof has been completed. Otherwise, µ(I \ A) > 0, and for any given 0 < ǫ < 1, we define a function g ǫ :
Define a consumption bundle h
. Now we show that S privately blocks f . Define a consumption bundle y ǫ : S × Ω → Y + such that y ǫ (t, ω) = g ǫ (t, ω) if (t, ω) ∈ A × Ω, and y ǫ (t, ω) = h ǫ (t, ω), if (t, ω) ∈ B × Ω. Clearly, y ǫ (t, ·) ∈ L t and V t (y ǫ (t, ·)) > V t (f (t, ·)) for all t ∈ S. It remains to verify that y ǫ is feasible for S. Since A (a(t, ·) − g(t, ·))dµ(t) ≥ z, we have
On the other hand, ǫz − ǫµ(A)z = ǫµ(I \ A)z > 0, and
Combining the previous few inequalities and equalities, we obtain
which verifies that S privately blocks f via y ǫ .
Characterizations of Walrasian expectations equilibrium
In this section, we provide characterizations of Walrasian expectations equilibrium in terms of the private blocking power of the grand coalition. The following concepts for asymmetric information economies in [15] will be needed. Definition 4.1. A coalition S ⊆ N privately blocks an allocation x of E in the sense of Aubin via y = (y i ) i∈S if for all i ∈ S, there is α i ∈ (0, 1] such that V i (y i ) > V i (x i ) and i∈S α i y i ≤ i∈S α i a i . The Aubin private core of E is the set of all feasible allocations which cannot be blocked by any coalition in the sense of Aubin, and an allocation x in E is called an Aubin dominated allocation if x is privately blocked by the grand coalition in the sense of Aubin.
The proof of our first theorem in this section is similar to that Theorem 4.2 in [15] . 
Remark 4.3 ([15]
). The participation of an agent i in the grand coalition of E is said to be close to complete ifα i > 1 − δ for sufficiently small δ > 0. Indeed, Theorem 4.2 shows that the participation of each agent can be chosen to be close to complete. To see this, for any given 0 < δ < 1, by Theorem 3.13, we can choose a privately blocking coalition S such that µ(S) The proof of our next theorem is similar to that of Theorem 4.1 in [14, 15] . For an allocation x = (x 1 , ..., x n ) in E and a vector r = (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ [0, 1] n , consider an asymmetric information economy E(r, x) which is identical with E except for the random initial endowment of each agent i being a i (r i ,
Theorem 4.5. Assume that E satisfies (A 1 )-(A 2 ), (A 4 )-(A 5 ) and (A 7 ), and its commodity space has an interior point in its positive cone. Then, a feasible allocation x in E is a Walrasian expectations allocation if and only if x is privately non-dominated in E(r, x) for any r ∈ [0, 1] n .
Remark 4.6 ([15]
). Note that for each agent i ∈ N ,r i can be selected arbitrarily close to 1. To see this, for any given 0 < δ < 1, by Theorem 3.13, we can choose a privately blocking coalition S such that µ(S) ] n . Thus, the first welfare theorem is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.5 and the first part of Remark 4.7.
Observe that if x is privately Pareto optimal in E, then x is also privately Pareto optimal in E(0, x). If we choose x = a, then all economies E(r, x) are equal to E(0, x) and x is not privately blocked by the grand coalition. If inf{x i (ω) : ω ∈ Ω} > 0 for all i ∈ N , Theorem 4.5 and the first part of Remark 4.7 implies that x is a Walrasian expectations allocation, which is exactly the second welfare theorem.
We conclude this section with some basic examples of Banach lattices and a chart containing a summary where these Banach lattices are applied: (i) R n : the Euclidean space; (ii) ℓ ∞ : the space of real bounded sequence with the supremum norm; (iii) L ∞ (Ω, Σ, µ): the space of essentially bounded, measurable functions on a measure space (Ω, Σ, µ) with the essential supremum norm; (iv) C(K): the space of real valued continuous functions on a compact Hausdorff space K with the supremum norm; (v) ℓ p : the space of real sequences x = {x n } with the norm 
In this section, we apply results established in previous sections, particularly Theorem 3.13, to characterize the ex-post core and private core of an economy with an arbitrary probability space of states of nature. Let E be a discrete economy identical with E except for the space of states of nature being a probability measure space (Ω, Σ, ν), where Ω is an (infinite) arbitrary set of states of nature, the σ-algebra Σ denotes the set of events and the probability measure ν denotes the common prior of each agent i ∈ N . For any x i : Ω → Y + , the ex ante expected utility of agent i is given by
The concepts of an assignment and an allocation in E are defined in the same way as that in E. Further, an allocation (assignment) x is said to be feasible if
A feasible assignment x of E is called fine non-dominated (resp. weak fine non-dominated ) if for all i ∈ N , x i is F i -measurable (resp. i∈N F i -measurable) and there is no feasible assignment y = (y 1 , ..., y n ) such that y i is i∈N F i -measurable and
A coalition is a non-empty subset S of N . A coalition S ⊆ N privately blocks an allocation x in E if there exists y = (y i ) i∈S such that y i ∈ L i and V i (y i ) > V i (x i ) for all i ∈ S, and i∈S y i (ω) ≤ i∈S a i (ω) for almost all ω ∈ Ω. The private core of the economy E is the set of all feasible allocations which are not privately blocked by any coalition. A feasible allocation x of E is in the ex-post core [8] of E if there are no coalition S ⊆ N , y = (y i ) i∈S , and Ω 0 ∈ Σ such that ν(Ω 0 ) > 0, i∈S y i (ω) ≤ i∈S a i (ω) for almost all ω ∈ Ω 0 , and
for all i ∈ S and for almost all ω ∈ Ω 0 .
Assume that E c is a continuum economy associated with E. Since F t = F i for each agent t ∈ I i , infinitely many states can be taken in E c even agents share their information. An assignment in E c is a function f : , ·) ) for all t ∈ S, and S g(t, ω)dµ(t) ≤ S a(t, ω)dµ(t) for almost all ω ∈ Ω. The private core of E c is the set of feasible allocations not privately blocked by any coalition. A feasible allocation f of E c is in the ex-post core of E c if there are no coalition S ⊆ I, function g : f (t, ω) ) for all t ∈ S and for almost all ω ∈ Ω 0 .
Next, we establish a relation between the set of all fine non-dominated allocations and the ex-post core. This result is new even for finite dimensional commodity space. For an ω ∈ Ω, let E c (ω) denote the full information economy whose commodity space being Y + , the set of agents being I, the utility function and initial endowment of agent t being U t (ω, ·) and a(t, ω) respectively. Theorem 4.9. Assume that E satisfies (A 1 )-(A 3 ) and (A 5 ). Let x be a feasible allocation of E. If x is fine non-dominated in E(r, x) for any r ∈ [0, 1] n , then x is in the ex-post core of E.
Proof. Suppose that x is not in the ex-post core of E. Then, the simple function f on I, defined by f (t, ·) = x i for all t ∈ I i and i ∈ N , is not in the ex-post core of E c . Thus, there is Ω 0 ∈ Σ with ν(Ω 0 ) > 0 such that f (·, ω) is feasible and not in the core of E c (ω) for almost all ω ∈ Ω 0 . Let A ∈ i∈N F i with ν(Ω 0 ∩ A) = 0. Applying Theorem 3.13 for each E c (ω) and the fact that f (t, ·) and a(t, ·) are constant on Ω 0 ∩ A for all t ∈ I, there exist a coalition S A ⊆ I with µ(S A ) > 1 − 1 n , and a function g A : f (t, ω) ) for all t ∈ S A and for almost all ω ∈ Ω 0 ∩ A.
Pick an ω 0 ∈ Ω 0 ∩A such that both (A.1.1) and (A.1.2) hold. Now, define a function
x is fine dominated by b in E(r A , x). The proof is completed.
We conclude this section with a characterization of the private core of E by the set of all privately non-dominated allocations of E(r, x), which is new even for finite dimensional commodity space. Proof. Let x be in the private core of E. Suppose that x is privately dominated in E(r, x) for some r = (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ [0, 1] n . Then, there is an allocation (y 1 , ..., y n ) such that V i (y i ) > V i (x i ) for each i ∈ N and i∈N y i (ω) ≤ i∈N {r i a i (ω) + (1 − r i )x i (ω)} for almost all ω ∈ Ω. Since x is feasible, i∈N y i (ω) ≤ i∈N a i (ω) for almost all ω ∈ Ω, a contradiction with the fact that x is in the private core of E.
Conversely, let x be a privately non-dominated allocation in E(r, x) for any r ∈ [0, 1] n . Assume that x is not in the private core of E. Then, the simple function f on I is not in the private core of E c Note that the conclusion of Theorem 3.13 is true in E c under (A 1 )-(A 3 ) and (A 5 ). Then, the conclusion can be derived by an argument similar to that in Theorem 4.5. Let E(s) be a symmetric information economy which is identical with E except for the information for each agent being F s i = i∈N F i . Corollary 4.11. Assume that E satisfies (A 1 )-(A 3 ) and (A 5 ). Then, a feasible allocation x is weak fine dominated in E(r, x) for any r ∈ [0, 1] n if only if x is in the private core of E(s).
Remark 4.12. In Section 4, we have applied the equivalence theorems and the Vind's type theorem in Section 3 to establish characterizations of Walrasian expectations allocations for an asymmetric economy with finitely many states of nature. The perspective reader may wonder why such characterizations are not discussed in the scenario where infinitely many states of nature are considered. Although Vind's theorem is valid for an economy with an arbitrary probability space of states of nature, these equivalence theorem are only valid for the scenario where finitely many states of nature are considered. So, the techniques employed in Section 4 do not allow us to establish similar results for characterizing Walrasian expectations allocations in the scenario with infinitely many states of nature. However, the difficulty may be overcome by applying new and different techniques, which could be done in the future work.
(A.2) Discussion on ATY-properness
In this subsection, we discuss about the ATY-properness of utility functions. Let
. Then, it is clear from the proof of Theorem 3.7 that we used the following fact from (A 8 ): (A.2.1) If x is a privately Pareto optimal allocation, then there is a convex and
We now introduce the definition of ATY-properness of a random utility function similar to that of preference relation. Definition 4.13. For ω ∈ Ω, the utility function
We need the following assumptions of agents' utility functions. 
Alternatively, similar to the v-properness of the preference relation in [2] , one can assume in the definition of ATY-properness of U i (ω, ·) that x i (ω) + y i (ω) ∈ int A i (ω, x i (ω)) for some y i ∈ L i in the place of (int A i (ω, x))∩Y + = ∅ and we obtain (A.2.1) by using (A 
, and so P i is ATY-proper. Applying a similar argument, one can derive the strong ATY-proper preference relation by taking
Given a real vector space X, a function · : X → [0, ∞) satisfying (i) x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X and x = 0 if and only if x = 0; (ii) αx = |α| x for all x ∈ X and α ∈ R; (iii) x + y ≤ x + y for all x, y ∈ X, is called a norm on X, and (X, · ) is called a normed space. If A and Z are subsets of a normed space (X, · ) with A ⊆ Z, the closure and the interior of A in the relative topology generated by norm on Z are denoted by · Z -clA and · Z -intA respectively. When Z = X, without confusion, we simply write · -clA and · -intA instead. In addition, if A is convex with · -intA = ∅, then · -clA = · -cl( · -intA). If X is a real vector space and ≤ is a partial order on X, then the pair (X, ≤) is called an ordered vector space if for any x, y, z ∈ X and any positive real number α, x ≥ y implies that αx + z ≥ αy + z. Recall that a Riesz space is an ordered vector space that is also a lattice, that is, every pair of elements x, y ∈ X has a supremum x ∨ y and an infimum x ∧ y. For any element x of a Riesz space, |x| stands for the absolute value of x and is expressed in the form |x| = x + + x − , where x + = x ∨ 0 and x − = (−x) ∨ 0 are positive and negative parts of x respectively. Note that x = x + − x − and x + ∧ x − = 0. An element x ∈ X is called a positive element of X if x ≥ 0 and X + = {x ∈ X : x ≥ 0}. We write x > 0, if x ∈ X + and x = 0. For two points x, y ∈ Y , x > y means x − y > 0. If x ≤ y in X, then [x, y] denotes the order interval {z ∈ X : x ≤ z ≤ y}. A subset A of X is called order bounded if A ⊆ [x, y] for some x, y ∈ X. A norm is called a lattice norm if |x| < |y| implies x ≤ y . A normed Riesz space is a Riesz space with a lattice norm. A complete normed Riesz space is called a Banach lattice. A lattice norm on a Riesz space is an M -norm if x ∨ y = max{ x , y } for any x, y ≥ 0. An M -space is a normed Riesz space with an M -norm. A norm complete M -space is an AM -space. A subset A of a Riesz space is called solid if |x| < |y| and y ∈ A imply x ∈ A. A solid vector subspace of a Riesz space is called an ideal. A pair (X, τ ) is called a locally solid Riesz space if X is a Riesz space and τ is a linear topology on X such that τ has a basis at zero consisting of solid neighborhoods.
A linear functional f : X → R on a Riesz space X is called ordered bounded if f (A) is bounded in R for any order bounded subset A of X. Recall that an order dual X of a Riesz space X is an ordered vector space consisting of all order bounded linear functionals on X under the usual algebraic operations, and the ordering f ≤ g if f, x ≤ g, x for all x ∈ X + . If (X, · ) is a normed space, its norm dual X * is the set of continuous linear functionals on X equipped with the norm · defined by f = sup{| f, x | : x ∈ X, x ≤ 1}. If (X, · ) is a locally solid Riesz space, X * is an ideal in X. If (X, · ) is a Banach lattice, then X * = X and · -topology is the finest locally solid topology on X. The order dual X of any Riesz space X is an order complete Riesz space, and its lattice operations are given by f ∨ g, x = sup{ f, y + g, z : y, z ∈ X + and y + z = x} and f ∧ g, x = inf{ f, y + g, z : y, z ∈ X + and y + z = x} for all f, g ∈ X, and x ∈ X + . These two equalities are called the Riesz-Kantorovich formulas. The Hahn-Banach Theorem claims that a continuous linear functional defined on a subspace of a normed space can be extended to a continuous linear functional on the entire space, with its norm preserved. In addition, the separation theorem says for any two disjoint (non-empty) convex subsets A and B in a Banach lattice (X, · ), if either A or B has non-empty interior, then there exists a non-zero f ∈ X * that separates A and B. Let X be a Banach lattice. If Ω is a finite set, then X Ω is endowed with pointwise algebraic operations, the pointwise order and the product norm of X is a Banach lattice. If x ∈ (X, · ) Ω (i.e., X Ω equipped with the · Ω -topology) and g ∈ ((X, · ) Ω ) * , then there is an element f ∈ ((X, · ) * ) Ω such that g, x = ω∈Ω f (ω), x(ω) and vise-versa. For any x ∈ X, the principal ideal generated by x is defined by L(x) = {y ∈ X : |y| ≤ n|x| for some n ∈ N}. A point x ∈ X + is called an order unit of X if L(x) = X, and a quasi-interior point of X + if L(x) is norm dense in X (equivalently, f, x > 0 for all f ∈ X * + \ {0}). If x is a quasi-interior point of X + , we write x ≫ 0. An order unit is a quasiinterior point, but the converse is not true in general. Note that L(x) with the norm y x = inf{λ > 0 : |y| < λ|x|} is an AM-space with x as an order unit.
Let (Ω, Σ, µ) be a measure space and X a Banach lattice. A function φ : Ω → X that assumes only a finite number of values, say x 1 , ..., x n , is called a simple function if A i = φ −1 ({x i }) ∈ Σ for each i. As usual, the formula φ = n i=1 x i 1 Ai is the standard representation of φ, where 1
Ai (t) = 1, if t ∈ A i ; 0, otherwise, is called the characteristic function of A i on Ω. Moreover, we say that a function f : Ω → X is µ-measurable if there exists a sequence of simple functions {φ n : n ≥ 1} such that lim f (t) − φ n (t) = 0 for almost all t ∈ Ω. A µ-measurable function f : Ω → X is said to be Bochner integrable if there exists a sequence of simple functions {φ n : n ≥ 1} such that the real measurable function f (t) − φ n (t) is Lebesgue integrable for each n and lim Ω f (t) − φ n (t) dµ(t) = 0. In this case, for each E ∈ Σ, the Bochner integral of f over E is defined by E f (t)µ(t) = lim E φ n (t)dµ(t), where the last limit is in the norm topology on X.
